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Executive Summary 
 
The primary objective of this study is to calculate the amount of value that is created by 
venture-capital backed companies, and to compare these valuations across jurisdictions. 
Our measure of value creation is the value of companies at the time of an initial public 
offering, or at the time of an acquisition. Since venture capitalists and other early 
investors have an opportunity to liquidate their investments at this time, this is commonly 
referred to as the “exit value.”  
 
By focusing on exit values we are looking at “output” measures of venture capital 
performance rather than “input” measures, like total investment. Exit values are a 
fundamental measure of venture capital activity. They quantify what is arguably the most 
important outcome of venture capital investments, namely the value of the companies 
they finance. As such, exit values allow us to compare the performance of venture capital 
markets across different jurisdictions (i.e. Canadian provinces and US states). 
 
The principal finding of this study is that Canada in general and British Columbia in 
particular perform surprisingly well (compared to U.S. jurisdictions) using exit values as 
a performance measure once differences on aggregate size or in inputs are accounted for.  
Specifically, Canada has higher exit values per dollar of GDP, per dollar of R&D 
spending, and per dollar of venture capital investment. Within Canada, British Columbia 
and Alberta are the strongest performers on these measures. Canada does have smaller 
average exit values (i.e. successful ventures tend to be smaller at exit than in the United 
States), which might be viewed as a negative point. However, on the positive side, 
Canada also has relatively more exits and a shorter average time to exit than the United 
States.  
 
This study focuses on the period 1997 to 2004. 509 exits of Canadian venture capital 
backed companies generated a total exit value of US$30 billion, compared to 3047 
companies generating US$381 billion in the US. The exit value of a typical Canadian 
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 company was lower, with an average (median) of US$59 million (US$20 million), 
compared to US$192 million (US$92 million) in the US. However, exits occurred faster 
in Canada, with the average (median) time from founding to exit being 76 (50) months, 
compared to 85 (61) months in the US.  
 
So far, these results confirm the common notion that, in absolute terms, the Canadian 
market is much smaller than the US. However, the main finding of this study is that once 
we account for apparent differences between these two economies, the Canadian market 
performs surprisingly well. If we compare total exit values against GDP, we find that 
Canada outperforms the US by 3%. When compared against the amount of venture 
capital investment, Canada outperforms the US by 15%. Comparing the performance of 
the two countries’ venture capital markets against the amount of R&D spending, Canada 
generates more exit value for every dollar spent on R&D. Canada generates 79% more 
exit value per dollar spent on R&D. This figure increases to 125% for private sector 
R&D. 
 
The two countries experienced a similar boom and bust cycle over the period 1997-2004, 
with clear signs of recovery in 2004. One important difference between the two countries 
is that information and communication technology account for almost three quarters of all 
the exit value created in the US, compared to about half in Canada. Canada generated 
relatively more exit value in sectors such as energy and sustainable technology. 
 
This study also compares the performance of the individual Canadian provinces against 
US states. California generates the highest total exit value, reflecting both its size and 
venture capital intensity, followed by Massachusetts, Texas and New York. Possibly a 
surprising result is that Ontario ranks fifth, with a total exit value of US$14 billion. 
Within Canada the order of exit values reflects the relative size of the provinces. After 
Ontario, Quebec has next largest venture capital exit value with US$5 billion, followed 
surprisingly closely by British Columbia with US$4.2 billion, and Alberta with US$3.7 
billion. Ontario has the highest average and median exit value. The western provinces of 
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 Alberta and British Columbia have the fastest times to exit, not only in Canada, but also 
when compared to the US states.  
 
If we compare each jurisdiction’s performance relative to its GDP, we find that California 
and Massachusetts continue to have the highest exit value creation rates. Measured 
against R&D spending they continue to do well. However, if compared against the 
amount of venture capital investment, their performance is markedly weaker.  
 
British Columbia and Alberta are the two most profitable jurisdictions across all of 
Canada and the US, when evaluated against R&D spending. They also continue to 
perform very well when compared against the level of venture capital investments. These 
findings reinforce our central theme that smaller venture capital market may sometimes 
be the most efficient ones.  
 
We also examine the generation of exit values across different sectors. Information and 
communication technology dominates most US states. In Canada this is also true for 
British Columbia, and to a lesser extent for Ontario. In Alberta, energy is the dominant 
sector. Quebec has a more varied structure, where information and communication 
technology, life sciences, and other sectors (such as manufacturing) all make significant 
contributions to the total exit value. 
 
We believe that this study is the first to provide a systematic comparison of exit values 
across Canadian and US jurisdictions. One important innovation is our data collection 
method, which allows us to obtain acquisition values. A second innovation is our 
emphasis on exit values in the first place. Most prior studies that compare venture capital 
markets focus on the inputs in this market, namely the amount of investments made. This 
study argues that exit values are the key to evaluating the relative performance of venture 
capital markets. 
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 1. Background and objectives 
 
Venture capital is widely considered to be an important contributing force to economic 
growth. Venture capitalists finance entrepreneurial companies that commercialize 
innovations, and that play a crucial role in promoting competition and economic renewal. 
The value created by venture capital backed companies benefits investors, entrepreneurs, 
employees, customers, and the economy at large, including by providing tax revenues for 
governments. The most direct measure for this value creation process is the value of the 
entrepreneurial companies themselves. This value is naturally measured at the time that 
venture capitalists exit their investments. Successful exits normally occur either at or 
shortly after an initial public offering (IPO), or at the time that an entrepreneurial 
company is acquired by another firm. In this study we set out to examine the value 
created by venture capital backed companies, measured at the time of exit.  
 
Our primary objective is to compare exit values of venture capital backed companies 
across different Canadian provinces and US states. Exit values play a fundamental role 
for the venture capital market. Put simply, exit values measure how much money is 
created in the venture capital process. Formally, exit values measure the total amount of 
value that is created for the shareholders of venture capital backed companies. This 
includes not only the value harvested by venture capitalists themselves, but also the value 
gained by all other shareholders, such as the entrepreneurs, employees with stock options, 
and other equity investors (e.g., angel investors). 
 
A comparison of exit values can reveal important economic patterns concerning how the 
various provinces compare with each other in terms of their entrepreneurial economic 
activity. More exits and higher values are indicators of a more active entrepreneurial 
environment. Looking at total exit value incorporates both the number of exits and the 
size of exits. Naturally, different jurisdictions can have different exit values because of 
differences in their relative size. We therefore consider a number of benchmarks against 
which we can compare the exit values of the different provinces and states.  
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 The calculations of total exit values are of economic interest by themselves. But in 
addition, our analysis compares the relative importance of IPOs versus acquisitions as 
exit channels for venture capital backed enterprises, and examines how exit values vary 
by year and across industries. 
 
A systematic compilation of exit values is a breakthrough in the literature on venture 
capital activity. We are not aware of any prior systematic study that attempts to measure 
and compare exit values across provinces and states. Our study also makes several 
important contributions to the measurement methodology of exit values. In particular, we 
use a number of new data collection methods to provide more comprehensive coverage of 
acquisition events than has previously been achieved. 
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 2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Existing studies of returns in venture capital 
 
In the US, the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA, www.nvca.org) regularly 
publishes rates of returns for the US venture capitalists. Many industry observers 
consider these returns unreliable, since they are based on a relatively small sample of 
venture capital firms, and are self-reported. There appears to be systematic under-
reporting of underperforming investments, as well as by underperforming venture capital 
funds. Recently, Sand Hill Econometrics (www.sandhillecon.com) tried to address these 
problems by constructing an index for the venture capital industry that successfully 
corrects for some of these biases.  
 
A small academic literature attempts to provide estimates of the returns in venture capital. 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use US data from a sample, collected by Venture Economics, 
for the period 1980 to 2001. Based on the cash flows of the venture capital firms, they 
calculate a mean return of 17% (median of 11%). Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2002) use US 
data from a sample collected by Venture Economics, for the period 1980 to 1999, and 
find a mean return of 19.25% (median of 9.13%). Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) use 
proprietary US data from an anonymous large limited partner, covering the period 1981-
1993, and find a mean return of 19.81 % (median of 18.66%). Gompers and Lerner 
(1997), using proprietary US data from Warburg Pincus, find a return of 30.5%, and 
provide various estimates of excess returns. Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) use a 
sample of Canadian venture capital investments, collected by Macdonald & Associates, 
for the period 1992 to 1997. They find an average return of 24.5%, and an investment-
weighted return of 16.3%. All of these studies estimate the return to the venture capital 
investor and are therefore "gross" returns rather than "net" returns.1  
 
                                                 
1 These studies typically calculate the gross returns to the venture capital firm. These gross returns should 
not be compared directly with standard financial returns to passive instruments (such as bonds) as various 
costs would need to be deducted first. To identify returns to limited partners or net returns it would be 
necessary , in particular, to take out carried interest and management fees but this information is  rarely 
disclosed. 
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 Several studies also consider the returns to venture-capital backed companies. Cochrane 
(2003) uses US data from a sample collected by VentureOne for the period 1987 to 2000. 
He constructs maximum likelihood estimates for an asset return model that accounts for 
selection bias from un-exited companies. He estimates a 15% return, and after accounting 
for market return and risk, he finds an excess return of -7%. Cumming and MacIntosh 
(2003) use a survey-based sample, collected by Venture Economics for the US and the 
Canadian Venture Capital Association for Canada, covering the period 1992-1995. They 
estimate a 5.6% return for the US and a -3.2% return for Canada.  
 
While this literature has made several important contributions, for our purposes it also 
has several shortcomings. First, these studies are based on incomplete and often rather 
small samples rather than on data sets that capture something close to the entire 
population of venture capital investments. This raises a significant possibility of 
"selection bias" in the sense that the included observations might differ from the rest of 
the population.  In particular, as data reporting is voluntary it is likely to be biased 
towards underreporting of poor returns. Second, none of these studies focuses on inter-
provincial/state differences of venture capital performance.2
 
 
2.2. Methodological preliminaries 
 
For this study we had no access to any proprietary returns data from venture capitalists, 
firms receiving venture capital, or related organizations. Moreover, there is no source of 
reliable and complete data on the amount of investments obtained by the entire 
population of all venture capital backed companies in Canada and the US. We therefore 
refrain from attempting to calculate rates of return, which would be based on incomplete 
and potentially biased self-reported data. Instead, we focus solely on an estimation of the 
value of realized exit events. While this constitutes a compromise, our approach has 
several important advantages. It does not require data on the amount and timing of 
                                                 
2 The only prior study that focuses on inter-provincial comparison was undertaken by Greenstone Venture 
Partners, with the participation of Ed Egan. This was essentially a sample-based pilot study, the results of 
which prompted this much more extensive population-level study. 
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 investments. (Return calculations require timing information both from venture capitalists 
and possibly from other investors.) It is less affected by the reporting bias that affects 
prior studies of venture capital activity as we use publicly available data to identify exits. 
And it allows us to consider a much larger set of companies. Indeed, we believe that we 
come close to having complete coverage of the population of exit events, and are certain 
that we have more comprehensive coverage than any previous study on either Canadian 
or US venture capital exits. 
 
Any study of venture capital exits faces two types of data availability problems. First, 
there is a disclosure problem. This is not a problem for IPOs, since all IPOs are publicly 
disclosed. For an exit value we use a company’s market capitalization, valued at the IPO 
offer price. Acquired private companies, however, are under no legal obligation to 
disclose acquisition values. The acquiring firm may or may not be required to disclose 
the transaction. If the acquiring firm is private, it has no legal obligation to disclose. If the 
acquiring firm is public (i.e., listed on a stock market), security laws prescribe that 
acquisitions must be disclosed, unless they are below certain thresholds (that may vary 
across countries and that typically depend on the acquirers’ own asset values and the 
transaction size). Apart from legal disclosure, there is also voluntary disclosure. Indeed, 
many public companies report all of their acquisitions, even if they fall below the legal 
thresholds. Likewise, some private acquirers make voluntary disclosures. Most venture 
capital investors are under no legal obligation to disclose exit data, and they typically 
choose not to voluntarily disclose such data either. The one notable exception is Canadian 
labor-sponsored venture capital funds that fall under a unique legal requirement to 
disclose their investment and exit data. 
 
Second, there is the data collection problem. This may seem surprising, but many of the 
commercial data sets fail to collect a significant amount of publicly disclosed data. 
Moreover, different commercial datasets have different data omissions, even if provided 
by the same data provider. We suspect that the main reason for these omissions are that 
companies do not need to report their publicly disclosed data directly to the data 
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 providers, and that data providers have insufficient interest in gathering all of this data by 
themselves at their own expense. 
 
For this study we do not make use of any data that is not publicly disclosed by 
companies. However, we develop a variety of new techniques for gathering data that is 
publicly disclosed, even if not collected by the commercial data providers. The use of 
some proprietary web-crawling algorithms is an important component of this data 
gathering technique. Moreover, we combine data from several commercial databases, to 
provide cross-validation and ensure a more comprehensive collection of exit values. Our 
study focuses on the time period 1997 to 2004. For this period, publicly disclosed data is 
readily available on the Internet. 
 
 
2.3. Data definitions  
 
Exit values matter because they measure the amount of value created by venture capital 
backed companies. It is natural to measure exit values at the time that venture capitalists 
are able to liquidate their investments. Unfortunately, there is no systematic data on 
exactly when venture capitalists exit their investments. We therefore use the following 
approach. We consider IPOs and acquisitions by public acquirers as our two exit events.3 
Acquisitions by a private acquirer may or may not represent an exit event for venture 
capitalists. If the acquisition is paid for in cash, we consider it an exit event. However, if 
the acquisition is paid for in stock, then the venture capitalist trades one illiquid stock for 
another, and we do not consider this a liquidity event. 
  
If a company fails, it may be liquidated. It is possible that a small amount of money is 
reported as an exit value, such as through a sale of assets. Since these amounts are very 
small, and since venture capitalists rarely obtain any of these proceeds – they typically 
are used to pay off more senior claim holders, such as bank debt – we exclude them from 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, venture capitalists can not exit at the time of the IPO, and typically must continue to 
hold their stock at least through the so-called ‘lock-up period’ and possibly beyond. Since we do not have 
any data on when venture capitalists exit, we focus on the IPO. 
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 our exit value calculation. This means that our exit values pertain to successful venture-
capital backed companies. We also do not consider as exit events company buybacks or 
secondary sales of venture capital shares, since these exit methods are also normally only 
associated with unsuccessful companies. Note that including unsuccessful companies 
would hardly affect our estimates of total exit values, although it would significantly 
reduce average exit values. 
 
In the US, an IPO always represents a meaningful liquidity event. For Canadian 
companies, the measurement of exit value presents one additional challenge. In Canada, 
there have been a number of junior stock exchanges, which were eventually amalgamated 
into the TSX Venture Exchange. The TSX-VN (or its predecessor exchanges) gives 
companies an opportunity to go public at a much earlier stage than any US stock 
exchange. However, an IPO on the TSX-VN does not necessarily represent a meaningful 
liquidity event for venture capitalists. This is in part because the exchange has very low 
liquidity, thus depriving venture capitalists of any real opportunity to sell much of their 
stock. We therefore adopt the following approach for recognizing a Canadian IPO. A 
listing on the TSX-VN alone is not treated as an IPO. Instead, to recognize a Canadian 
IPO, one of three possible conditions must be met.4 First, if the company upgrades to a 
major exchange (TSX, NASDAQ, NYSE, etc….), we count the subsequent offering as 
the exit event. Second, if there is direct evidence that venture capitalists were able to exit 
their investments through the TSX-VN listing, we count this as an exit event. This 
requires an explicit mention of a liquidity event in press reports, public statements of the 
company, or public statements of the venture capital firm. Third, if the offering size 
exceeds $1 million, we treat this as an exit event.5 This threshold eliminates the small 
offerings that are typical of illiquid junior market stocks. Companies that are able to raise 
more than $1 million typically have significantly more liquidity than firms that fall below 
that threshold. 
 
                                                 
4 If more than one of the above three criteria are satisfied, we count the first exit event as the relevant one. 
5 The offering can be a primary offering on the TSX-VN, or any secondary offering, if all previous 
offerings were below the $1 million threshold. Using $1 million as a threshold value is somewhat arbitrary, 
but not important to our findings. In unreported calculations we also considered using different thresholds, 
but found that this did not materially affect our main findings. 
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 A common occurrence in Canada is that companies first list on the TSX-VN and 
subsequently get acquired. The acquisition typically represents the real liquidity event for 
venture capitalists. Our methodology allows us to recognize this, since it does not record 
the listing on the TSX-VN, unless it satisfies the above-mentioned criteria.  
 
The Canadian market has a few additional peculiarities that are worth mentioning. A 
common method for going public is by a so-called “reverse takeover.” This means that a 
private company acquires a company that is listed already on the stock market, but 
effectively is only an empty shell company. The shell company typically has no assets 
and earnings, and may even have been de-listed by the exchange. By acquiring the shell 
company, the private company buys itself a public listing. Reverse takeovers are common 
practice in Canada, and are publicly described as such. We can therefore readily identify 
these transactions as reverse takeovers, and treat them as IPOs. At first, this transaction 
might appear as an acquisition, since there is a public company that acquires a private 
company. However, this is a regulatory artifact, since the public company has no 
operational entity. We therefore treat reverse takeovers as public listings. Whether we 
then count the IPO as an exit event depends on the same criteria as above. Specifically, 
we consider it an exit event, unless it occurs on a junior exchange, and the company 
raises less than CAN$1 million. 
 
A related Canadian peculiarity concerns “capital pool companies.” These are specially 
regulated companies that can make a small initial public offering (less than $500,000) to 
set up a publicly-traded company. By regulation, this entity cannot have any operational 
assets at the time of the IPO. The capital pool company can then acquire operational 
assets, and become a regular publicly traded operational company. This transaction is 
thus a reverse takeover, and we treat it accordingly.  
 
Finally, another unique feature of the Canadian market is income trusts. A company can 
issue an instrument that resembles preferred equity on the stock exchange. This promises 
a fixed dividend to income trust holders. However, these preferred shares are 
fundamentally different from common shares and, unlike in a typical venture capital 
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 setting, they are not convertible. Moreover, if a company issues an income trust, this does 
not provide any liquidity to the common shareholders. For this reason we do not count 
the issuance of an income trust as an exit event.  
 
For the comparisons across jurisdictions we use the location of the company. This means 
that we focus on the value created by venture capital companies. Our analysis does not 
make a distinction between local investors and investors that come from different 
jurisdictions.  
 
All of our measurements are in US dollars. Canadian dollars are converted into US 
dollars using Bank of Canada published monthly exchange rates.  
 
We consider a company venture capital backed if we can identify at least one venture 
capital investment in the company. In addition, we require that the venture capital 
investment occurred prior to the exit event. This implies that we exclude all private 
investments into public companies (PIPEs). Estimating the exit value of PIPEs seems 
inappropriate, since by definition these are already liquid investments. For Canadian 
companies, our definition of PIPEs is based on the same three criteria for recognizing 
IPOS as exit events. This means that if a company lists on the TSX Venture Exchange, 
but does not satisfy any of our three criteria for a liquid exit it remains a candidate for 
venture capital investments. If a venture capitalist invests after the initial TSX Venture 
listing, but before any of the three criteria are satisfied, we do not treat that venture 
capital investment as a PIPE deal. 
 
We exclude all private equity deals that are either explicitly mezzanine financing or 
leverage buyout financing (LBOs), or deals that come from funds that explicitly claim 
only to invest in mezzanine or buyout deals. If a corporation has an organized venture 
capital fund, we recognize this as venture capital. However, if a corporation makes 
private equity investments on an ad-hoc basis, we do not consider it a venture capital 
investment. These criteria provide a conservative perspective on exit values. In Canada, 
we exclude some well-known large exits, such as 360 Networks and Yellow Pages 
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 (which we classify as mezzanine financing) and Le Groupe Videotron (which we classify 
as corporate investment).   
 
 
2.4. Construction of benchmarks 
 
To compare exit values across jurisdictions, we naturally want to account for the different 
sizes of the local economies. We use a variety of benchmark measures that capture their 
relative sizes. Our first benchmark considers aggregate economic activity, as captured by 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as measured at the state or provincial level. Our second 
benchmark is based on the R&D investments across jurisdictions and we consider both 
the total level of R&D, as well as the level of private R&D. We can measure both of 
these benchmarks at the level of the individual jurisdictions.  The economic significance 
of these two benchmarks is very intuitive. We want to measure the value creation of 
venture capital relative to some standard measures of the size of the local economy. The 
GDP measure is a broad standard measure, whereas our two measures of R&D provide a 
more focused benchmark that is relevant for venture capital activity and  for innovation 
more broadly. 
 
Our third benchmark uses published data on the size of the local venture capital markets. 
Unfortunately, our data sources do not allow us to obtain the total amount of investment 
that individual companies receive. Nonetheless we have access to aggregate information 
about the level of venture capital investment in each jurisdiction. At this point, it should 
also be noted that venture capital backed companies obtain funding not only from venture 
capitalists, but also from other sources, such as angels and corporations. Comparing the 
total exit value to the amount of reported venture capital in each jurisdiction, however, 
provides an approximate idea of how much value is generated by venture capital backed 
companies, relative to the amount of money that is invested. Specifically we compare our 
exit values against the benchmark of the total venture capital investments made within 
the province/state. For this we use a moving 5-year average.6 Comparing exit values to 
                                                 
6 A 5-year horizon approximates the relevant investment period for the majority of our companies. 
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 investment levels is important, because, in an indirect manner, it accomplishes similar 
goals to rate of return calculations. In particular, at the aggregate level of each 
jurisdiction, it allows us to compare the total returns (total exit value) against some 
measure of investments (namely the total venture capital invested). Naturally, this 
benchmark is not a precise measure of rates of return, since it cannot take account of the 
timing of individual investments, nor can it match investments and exits at the level of 
individual companies. Still, at an aggregate level it provides a useful approximation that 
allows us to present some new and meaningful comparison of jurisdictions.  
 
Our fourth benchmark compares exit values against overall stock market performance. 
Our data covers the highly volatile period commonly referred to as the “dotcom boom 
and bust.” During this period, investor returns from investing in the stock market varied 
dramatically, as reflected in the wide swings of the NASDAQ index. Moreover, while 
some of the exit values, especially in 2000, were remarkably high, many of their prices 
subsequently fell, often by a large amount. Our exit values are thus affected by this boom 
and bust cycle. We control for this in two related manners. First, we divide exit values by 
the index value of the NASDAQ at the time of the exit event. This naturally deflates the 
high returns of the dotcom boom. The thought experiment is essentially that we compare 
exit values against some measure of alternative returns available to investors at the time 
of exit. Using the NASDAQ index implicitly assumes that all investors consider the 
NASDAQ as their alternative investment opportunity.  
 
Recent research in finance has demonstrated an important “home bias,” where investors 
allocate significantly larger amounts of investment to their home market. It may therefore 
be more appropriate to use different benchmarks for US and Canadian investors, to 
recognize differences in their perceived alternative investments. Our second approach is 
to divide all US exit values by the NASDAQ index, and all Canadian exit values by the 
TSX index (which is widely recognized to be the main index for Canadian stock market 
investors). To make the US and Canadian exit values comparable, we start the two 
indices simultaneously at 1, at the beginning of our sample period. 
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2.5. Data sources 
 
Our data comes from multiple sources, and involves a significant amount of integration 
and cross-validation. In this section we describe our data sources and briefly outline some 
of our integration methods.  
 
The data for US venture capital backed companies comes from Thomson Financial’s 
(www.thomson.com/financial) Venture Economics database (VE henceforth). This is a 
commercially sold database that has a broad coverage of US venture capital investments. 
Lerner (1995) and Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg (2003) discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of this dataset.  
 
The data for US IPOs comes from two main sources: VE and Thomson Financial’s 
Global New Issues database (GNI henceforth). GNI is the leading US database on IPOs, 
and has been widely used for academic research. Even though VE and GNI are offered by 
the same company (Thomson Financial), there is a considerable amount of non-
overlapping information in these two databases. We compile information from both 
databases. In the few instances where we find contradictory information across the two 
databases, we use the information from GNI, which is widely considered to be the most 
reliable database for US IPOs. 
 
The data for US acquisitions comes from VE, as well as from Thomson Financial’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions database (TFMA henceforth). TFMA contains information on 
all disclosed mergers and acquisitions, where either the acquiring or the target company 
is listed on a US exchange. It has been widely used for academic research. Again, we find 
that even though these two databases are offered by the same company, there is a 
considerable amount of non-overlapping information in these two databases, so that we 
compile information from both databases. In case of contradictions, we use the 
information from TFMA. 
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 All our data for Canadian companies is obtained from publicly available data. To identify 
Canadian venture capital backed companies we compiled lists of Canadian venture 
capital firms and their funds from published sources. These include the Canadian Venture 
Capital Association (CVCA) (www.cvca.ca), Réseau Capital (www.reseaucapital.com), 
Pratt’s Guide, and a large number of associations, forums, networks and websites. Based 
on these lists of venture capitalists, we obtain the names of venture capital backed 
companies in a variety of ways. We use both current and past websites of those venture 
capital firms. Historic websites can be accessed through the so-called “Way-back 
machine,” which contains an archive of web pages (www.archive.org). In addition to this, 
we use some proprietary web-crawling algorithms to extract other publicly available data 
about venture capital backed companies, such as from press reports and other public 
disclosures. As venture capitalists often invest in syndicates, and as an investment 
announcement will usually mention all syndicate members, we can be relatively certain 
that we have a near-comprehensive coverage of Canadian venture capital funds. 
 
The data for IPOs of Canadian venture capital backed companies comes from several 
sources. We extract all available information from the System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) for Canadian listings (www.sedar.com) and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for Canadian companies listing in the US 
(www.sec.gov). We focus on filings of IPO prospectuses, and identify all completed 
IPOs. We also cross-check our data with information from GNI (for US-listed Canadian 
companies) and FP Advisor (www.fpinfomart.ca). In addition we use some proprietary 
web-crawling algorithms to extract other publicly available data on IPOs, such as press 
reports and other public disclosures.  
 
The data for Canadian acquisitions comes from several sources. We obtain all relevant 
information available in SEDAR and SEC. We focus on the annual reports, which 
contain information on M&A activities of publicly-listed firms. We also use the TFMA 
database, mostly to confirm acquisitions of Canadian targets by US buyers. Again, we 
use our proprietary web-crawling algorithms to extract further publicly available data on 
mergers and acquisitions, from press reports and other public disclosures. The importance 
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 of these events to industry participants means that news is often available from multiple 
independent sources. Another important source of legal filings is the Strategis database 
(http://strategis.ic.gc.ca), which is maintained by Industry Canada. We extract 
information from the “Certificates of Amalgamation,” which contains information for all 
mergers and acquisitions where at least one of the two parties is federally incorporated. 
We extract information from the “Certificates of Discontinuance,” which contains 
information for all mergers and acquisitions where the acquired party is federally 
incorporated, and discontinuing its registration of incorporation. This allows us to 
identify acquisitions where the buyer is taking the target company outside of Canada. 
Finally, we use the “Certificates of Amendments” to trace name changes that either signal 
an acquisition itself, or allow us to trace subsequent acquisitions, including reverse 
takeovers. 
 
We obtain data on GDP and R&D from the OECD, using SourceOECD 
(www.titania.sourceoecd.org), as well as from their original sources at the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, the National Science Foundation, and Statistics Canada. 
 
We obtain data about US aggregate venture capital investments from a NVCA approved 
data source, namely the Price Waterhouse Moneytree survey (www.pwcmoneytree.com). 
For Canada, we use the data published by the CVCA.7 For the US, the aggregate 
investment data can be considered reasonably accurate. However, a question remains 
concerning the validity of the aggregate investment data on Canadian venture capital. Our 
understanding from talking to industry sources is that there is a concern that the available 
data not only underestimate the total amount of venture capital investments, but that there 
is also unequal coverage across provinces, with greater underreporting for the western 
provinces. For the purpose of this analysis, we made a determination that the aggregate 
statistics for Alberta cannot be considered sufficiently reliable to warrant their inclusion. 
We also caution that the estimates for British Columbia appear somewhat low, and that 
the coverage for some of the smaller provinces also appears incomplete. 
                                                 
7 For the initial three years of the sample we do not have a full preceding five year history of venture 
investment for the Canadian provinces, so we use the appropriate shorter moving average. 
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Our method of matching data across datasets is based on name-matching. This involves 
both computer-based matched algorithms, as well as a considerable amount of human-
based verification and cross-checking. We are also careful to track company name 
changes. This information is available in VE for US venture capital backed companies 
and in Strategis for federally incorporated Canadian venture capital backed companies.  
 
Overall, we believe that we have virtually complete coverage of all exits by IPO. As far 
as acquisitions are concerned we believe that this study contains the most comprehensive 
coverage of exits by acquisitions available to date. In particular, we believe that our 
coverage of acquisitions by publicly-listed buyers is close to complete. The percentage of 
such deals where the acquisition value remains undisclosed is also fairly low.8 The area 
where our coverage is likely to remain somewhat incomplete is acquisitions by privately-
held buyers. Such acquisitions remain difficult to trace, especially since they frequently 
involve no disclosure of the acquisition value. However, since most of these transactions 
are widely believed to be relatively small, and only rarely include acquisitions for cash, it 
is reasonable to believe that this omission is unlikely to significantly affect our 
measurement of exit values. 
 
We also make an attempt to determine the speed with which exits occur. Our data does 
not allow us to always determine the exact timing of when the first venture-capital 
investment was made. We therefore focus on the time between the founding of the 
company and the exit as a more dependable measure of the speed with which companies 
exit. For the US, we obtain this data from VE. For Canada, we can only obtain this data 
for federally incorporated companies, which amount to 140 out of our 509 exits. As a 
                                                 
8 Out of 370 Canadian M&As, we found 273 exit values, yielding a disclosure rate of 73.8%. Of the 
remaining 97 companies, 8 companies were acquired by foreign public companies which did not file to 
either SEDAR or the SEC. 32 companies were acquired by public companies that did file either with 
SEDAR or the SEC, but that did not disclosed their acquisition value, presumably because it fell below the 
legal disclosure threshold. Finally, 57 companies were acquired by private companies, and no additional 
information was undisclosed. In this case we are also unable to ascertain whether the transaction used stock 
or cash. If some of the transactions used stock, then they would not qualify as an exit event under our exit 
criteria. Including all 57 companies therefore overstates the amount of non-disclosure. Indeed, if we take 
out the 57 acquisitions by private acquirers, then the disclosure rate for public acquirers is 273 out of 313, 
or 87.2%. 
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 consequence, our data on the time between founding and exit requires two caveats. First, 
our estimates are based on limited data. Second, our measure is not a precise measure of 
the investment duration for the venture capitalists. In general, the founding data does not 
correspond to the investment date. Moreover, venture capitalists may hold on to their 
investments beyond the first liquidity opportunity, which is our measure of exit.  
 
2.6. Industry Classification 
 
Classifying industries is an inherently difficult task, and different data sources use 
different classification systems. For the purpose of this study we use a number of 
classification methods that, albeit imperfect, still provide a coherent picture of how exit 
values vary by industry.  
 
We focus on three sectors that are of particular importance to the venture capital industry: 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT henceforth), Life Sciences (LS 
henceforth), and Energy and Sustainable Technology (EST henceforth). No precise 
consensus definition exists for any of these sectors.  
 
For US companies, VE uses several proprietary industry classification systems. We use 
their so-called “Industry Sub Group 2” data. This industry classification system is geared 
towards venture capital investments. We are therefore able to provide a simple mapping 
from this classification system to our four industry classes (ICT, LS, EST and “Other”). 
Appendix I provides an explanation for this mapping.  
  
For Canadian companies, our data collection method requires that we categorize 
companies manually. As a conceptual basis for this manual classification system, we 
assign each company a North American Industry Classification (NAIC) code. NAIC 
codes actually provide a much more detailed industry classification than necessary for 
this study. The appendix provides a definition of how we allocate NAIC codes to our four 
industry categories. Our definition of ICT is very similar to that used by the British 
Columbia Technology Industries Association (BCTIA), and is also fairly similar to the 
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 definition proposed by the American Engineering Association (AEA). The AEA’s 
classification is slightly narrower, and indeed the AEA acknowledges that its definition 
may be too narrow. For example, it excludes semiconductor machinery. Our definition is 
slightly more inclusive, incorporating closely related industries, including semiconductor 
machinery. A well known problem is that NAIC codes are not well suited for tracking 
biotechnology companies. We include the usual categories that are used by biotechnology 
companies, and also try to be reasonably broad, such as by including health sciences. We 
are not aware of a precise definition for the EST sector. We therefore use a pragmatic 
approach of including all energy companies, as well as utilities and waste processing. 
This means that our data includes both sustainable and non-sustainable technologies. 
However, there is no credible classification mapping that separates sustainable from non-
sustainable production methods for these technology sectors.  
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 3. Analysis of exit values: Canada versus the US 
 
We begin our analysis with a comparison of the aggregate statistics of Canada versus the 
US. Table 1 summarizes the main results. All values are expressed in US dollars.  
 
The total exit value for the period 1997 to 2004 was just under $30 billion for Canada, 
compared with $381 billion in the US. This suggests that the in value terms, the Canadian 
market is approximately 8% relative to the US. As Canadian GDP was approximately 8% 
of U.S. GDP over this period (using market exchange rates), we can see that venture-
backed exit values are of comparable overall importance in the two countries. However, 
the actual number of exits is relatively higher in Canada, as the Canadian to U.S. ratio if 
fully 17% when comparing the total number of exits in Canada and the US. The 
difference between these two is readily explained by the different sizes of typical exits. 
The average value of a Canadian exit amounts to $59 million, compared with $192 
million in the US, showing that US exits are more than three times as large as in Canada. 
The distribution of venture capital returns is right skewed, so that the median exit value is 
lower than the average exit value. Table 1 shows that the median exit value in the US is 
more than four times as large as in Canada. 
 
One may ask to what extent these differences are driven by stronger IPO or stronger 
acquisition markets. Table 1 shows that the US dominates total, average and median 
values not only for IPOs, but also for M&As. The differences between the US and 
Canada are slightly less pronounced for M&As than for IPOs, but the gap between the 
two markets remains large. 
 
So far, our results are consistent with the common perception that Canada slightly lags 
the US in terms of the strengths of its venture capital market, at least as far as median and 
average values are concerned. Some of the other results in Table 1, however, shed some 
additional light on this comparison. For instance, exits tend to occur faster in Canada 
relative to the US.  Our estimated average (median) time between founding and exit is 76 
(50) months for Canada, compared with 85 (61) in the US. 
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Table 1: Comparing Exit Values: Canada versus US 
 
 Canada USA 
Canada 
/ US 
All Exits    
Total Value of Exits (US$b)        29.7  381.4 8% 
Number of Exits         509  3,047 17% 
Average Value of Exits (US$m)        58.9  191.6 31% 
Median Value of Exits (US$m)        20.5  92.4 22% 
Average Time Founding to Exit (Months)           76  85 90% 
Median Time Founding to Exit (Months)           50  61 82% 
IPO    
Total Value of Exits (US$b) 15.2  35.9  6% 
Number of Exits 139 746 19% 
Average Value of Exits (US$m) 111.9  333.2  34% 
Median Value of Exits (US$m) 49.9  224.9  22% 
Average Time Founding to Exit (Months) 80  85  93% 
Median Time Founding to Exit (Months) 67  62  107% 
M&A    
Total Value of Exits (US$b) 14.51  145.45  10% 
Number of Exits 370 2301 16% 
Average Value of Exits (US$m) 39.3 113.5 35% 
Median Value of Exits (US$m) 15.2 46.7 32% 
Average Time Founding to Exit (Months) 74 85  87% 
Median Time Founding to Exit (Months) 48 61 79% 
Benchmarks     
Total Value per $1000 GDP        4.99  4.83 103% 
Total Value per $1000 GERD   333.04  186.4 179% 
Total Value per $1000 BERD   579.89  257.53 225% 
Total Value per $1 VC Invested (5 yr avg.)        2.07  1.8 115% 
Total Value (NASDAQ Normalized)        15.1  193.3 8% 
Total Value (Domestic Index Normalized)        20.0  193.3 10% 
Sector Breakdown    
EST / Total Value of Exits  15% 2% N/A 
ICT / Total Value of Exits  50% 74% N/A 
Life Sciences / Total Value of Exits  8% 13% N/A 
Other / Total Value of Exits  27% 11% N/A 
 The most important insight from Table 1 is that the differences between the US and 
Canada disappear or are reversed once we benchmark exit values against measures of the 
relative size of the two economies. If we compare the total exit values relative to the sizes 
of the two economies, as measured by GDP, we find that Canada’s exit values are very 
similar to those of the US. Our estimates suggest that relative to its GDP, Canada actually 
generates slightly (3%) more exit value than the US. If we compare total exit values 
against the amount of R&D spending (as measured by GERD) we find an even stronger 
result. For every R&D dollar spent, Canada generates 79% more exit value than the US. 
One might suspect that this result could be driven by large public R&D spending in the 
US. However, if we compare Canada with the US using private sector R&D (as measured 
by BERD), we find that Canada outperforms the US by even more, generating more than 
twice as much exit value for every private dollar spent on R&D. 
 
If we compare the total exit values against the amount of investment in the venture 
capital industry, we note that Canada continues to outperform, although by the smaller 
margin of 15%. Because the Canadian data is likely to underestimate the total amount of 
venture capital investment, it is possible that the total exit values across the two countries 
are in fact even more similar than suggested by the estimates of Table 1. If we normalize 
exit values against the NASDAQ index, the comparison of exit values between Canada 
and the US is essentially unaffected, with Canadian exit values at 8% relative to the US. 
If we normalize exit values against the domestic stock market index (NASDAQ for the 
US and TSX for Canada), the Canadian market performs slightly better, about 10% of the 
US value. 
  
Finally, it is interesting to note that Canadian and US venture capitalists invest in slightly 
different sectors. It is true that information and communication technology is the leading 
sector in both countries, but in the US they account for almost three quarters of the total 
exit value, compared with about half the exit value in Canada. The life sciences sector is 
relatively more important in the US, while energy and sustainable technology is of 
greater importance in Canada. Finally “Other” sectors (mainly manufacturing and 
services) are much more important in Canada than in the US.  
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 4. Analysis of exit values: Comparing Canadian Provinces and US states 
 
Our data allows us to compare the total exit values of Canadian provinces and US states. 
In the appendix we provide a comprehensive listing of this comparison. Table A1 reports 
total exit values for the period 1997 - 2004. Table A2 provides data on a large number of 
exit value statistics. This table contains all of the Canadian provinces, and the US states 
that had a total exit value exceeding US$1 billion.  
 
Before we begin with the analysis of comparing exit performance across jurisdictions, we 
present some data on the most successful companies in our data set. Specifically, Table 2 
presents a list of the five largest exits for the four leading Canadian provinces, as well as 
California and Massachusetts.   
 
4.1 Basic exit statistics  
 
Chart 1A shows the top ten jurisdictions ranked by total exit value. Several points are 
worth noting. First the chart clearly demonstrates that California is an outliner in terms of 
exit values. Indeed, California accounts for approximately 44% of the total exit value in 
the United States. Massachusetts, Texas and New York are the next largest states in exit 
value. This conforms to the received wisdom about relative rankings in the venture 
capital industry. The fact that Ontario is fifth, however, might be considered a surprise. 
Indeed it suggests that the strength of the Canadian venture capital industry is frequently 
underestimated. 
 
Chart 1B compares the exit values of the four leading Canadian provinces, namely (in 
alphabetical order) Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. With almost US$14 
billion, Ontario clearly has the largest total exit value, followed by Quebec with US$5 
billion. British Columbia is third with US$4.2 billion, followed by Alberta with US$3.7 
billion. 
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 Table 2: Top five exits for selected provinces and states 
 
 Company Name Year
Exit Value 
(US$m) Exit Type Sector* 
 
British Columbia 
 Abatis Systems 2000       656 Acquisition ICT 
 Creo Inc. 1999       488 IPO ICT 
 Xantrex Technology Inc.  2004       375 IPO EST 
 ALI Technologies Inc. 2002       347 Acquisition ICT 
 MacDonald Dettwiler & Assoc. 2000       327 IPO ICT 
Ontario 
 Electrovaya Inc. 2000    1,110 IPO Other 
 Solect Technology Group Inc. 2000    1,088 Acquisition ICT 
 724 Solutions Inc. 2000       912 IPO ICT 
 Balisoft Technologies 2000       656 Acquisition ICT 
 Delano Technology Corporation 2000       603 IPO ICT 
Quebec 
 Sabex 2004       565 Acquisition Life Science 
 Saputo Group Inc. 1997       469 IPO Other 
 Rona Inc. 2002       412 IPO Other 
 Mega Bloks Inc. 2002       251 IPO Other 
 Adaltis Inc. 2004       224 IPO Life Science 
Alberta 
 OPTI Canada Inc. 2004    1,238 IPO EST 
 Fairborne Energy Limited 2004       431 RTO EST 
 Western Oil Sands 2000       374 IPO EST 
 A-Channel Inc. 2004       218 Acquisition Other 
 180 Connect Inc. 2004       189 IPO ICT 
California 
 eToys 1999    2,068 IPO ICT 
 SiByte, Inc. 2000    2,068 Acquisition ICT 
 Bookham Technology 2000    1,803 IPO ICT 
 Turnstone Systems Inc. 2000    1,749 IPO ICT 
 Inktomi Corporation 1998    1,684 IPO ICT 
Massachusetts 
 CoreTek Inc. 2000    1,915 Acquisition ICT 
 Spring Tide Networks Inc. 2000    1,347 Acquisition ICT 
 Viant Corporation 1999       984 IPO ICT 
 MatrixOne Inc.  2000       955 IPO ICT 
 Nexabit Networks Inc 1999       896 Acquisition ICT 
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 The chart also shows the values for the rest of Canada (ROC), which amounts to another 
US$2.8 billion, and breaks down the relative contribution of IPOs and acquisitions. In 
Ontario and Quebec acquisitions account for more than half, in Alberta they account for 
less than half, and in British Columbia they account for almost exactly half of the exit 
value.  
 
Chart 1C considers five selected US states that are of particular relevance to British 
Columbia, and Canada at large. Each of these states was chosen for a specific reason. 
Connecticut is the state that is most similar to British Columbia, in terms of its total exit 
value. Washington State and Oregon are the two states that are geographically closest to 
British Columbia in the Pacific Northwest. Texas is wildly recognized as a leading cluster 
for information and communication technology. North Carolina, and especially its 
research triangle, is widely thought to be a leading biotechnology cluster. Chart 1C shows 
wide disparities in the total exit values, with Texas being the largest of our comparison 
states, and Oregon being the smallest.  
 
Chart 1A: Total Value of Exits – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 1B: Total Value of Exits – Canadian Provinces 
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 Charts 2A, B and C perform a similar analysis for the total number of exits. Chart 2A 
shows that California is an extreme outlier, with over 1200 exits over the sample. The 
relative ranking of other US states is approximately similar than in chart 1A. Ontario is 
ranked third, with 223 exits, and Quebec sixth with 118 exits. Chart 2B shows that the 
relative ranking among Canadian provinces is the same as in Chart 1B. Chart 2C shows 
that the relative ranking is also preserved for our US comparison states. 
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 Chart 2B: Number of Exits – Canadian Provinces 
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 Charts 3A, B and C focus on the average exit value. This provides a measure of how 
large or successful a typical venture-capital backed company is. An important 
methodological point to note is that, beginning with Chart 3A, all of our top ten rankings 
focus exclusively on those jurisdictions that had a total exit value exceeding US$1 
billion. Excluding the smaller jurisdictions seems appropriate, since they are somewhat 
less important to an understanding of the main value drivers of the US and Canadian 
venture capital industry.  
 
Possibly the most surprising result in Chart 3A is that California no longer ranks first. 
This may be considered particularly surprising given that California has an unusually 
large number of companies with more than US$1 billion of exit value (see Table 2). The 
result in Chart 3A suggests that in addition to these very large exits, California also has a 
large number of companies with only moderately successful exit values. Another 
interesting finding in Chart 3A is that Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia all 
rank in the top five. These three jurisdictions host many of the defense related start-ups, 
companies that often generate large exit values.  
 
An important result in Chart 3A is that none of the Canadian provinces makes the top ten 
ranking. Indeed, Chart 3B shows that the average value in the Canadian provinces is 
significantly smaller than in the US. This result appears to be true across all jurisdictions, 
and continues to apply both for IPOs and acquisitions. This confirms that, relative to 
Canada, venture-capital backed companies in the US generate larger exit values. Chart 
3B also suggests that the average exit value is fairly similar across Canadian provinces. 
In Ontario, IPOs are slightly larger. In Quebec, IPOs and acquisitions are slightly smaller.  
 
Chart 3C shows that there are considerable differences in the average exit values across 
our comparison US states. In particular, we note that the cluster-focused states of Texas 
and North Carolina have higher average exit values, both in terms of IPOs and 
acquisitions. Oregon has the lowest average exit values of the comparison states. 
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 Chart 3A: Average Value of Exits – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
- 50 100 150 200 250 300
Virginia
Texas
Maryland
North Carolina
D. of Columbia
New York
Illinois
California
New Jersey
Minnesota
 
Chart 3B: Average Value of Exits – Canadian Provinces 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Alberta BC Ontario Quebec ROC
Ex
it 
Va
lu
e 
(U
S$
m
)
Av. IPO
Av. M&A
 
 28
 Chart 3C: Average Value of Exits – US Comparison States 
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Charts 4A, B and C perform a similar analysis than 3A, B and C, using the median exit 
value. The qualitative results are very similar, although some of the details differ. The 
relative ranking of some of the states changes in Chart 4A. Chart 4B shows that Alberta 
has a significantly lower median IPO value than the other large Canadian provinces. 
Chart 4C shows some minor differences in the relative ranking of the comparisons states.  
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 Chart 4A: Median Value of Exits – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 4C: Median Value of Exits – US Comparison States 
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Chart 5A, B and C document the average time from founding to exit. They show that 
Alberta and British Columbia have the lowest average time between founding and exit. 
Since venture capitalists care a lot about a rapid path to liquidity, this is an important 
result. One conjecture for this may be that venture capitalists in the western provinces 
make more extensive use of junior stock markets. Still, these liquidity events can be 
considered economically meaningful events, since our exit criterion recognizes junior 
market listing only if they satisfy some minimal size threshold (namely that the company 
raises more than CAN$1 million). Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that the faster path 
to liquidity applies not only to IPOs, but also to acquisitions, suggesting that junior 
markets are only part of the reason why Alberta and British Columbia have the fastest 
exits.  
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 Chart 5A: Average Time Founding to Exit – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 5C: Average Time Founding to Exit – US Comparison States 
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Charts 6A, B and C perform a similar analysis for the median time to exit. Because the 
distribution of exit times is right-skewed, the medians are lower than the averages. 
Overall, the median time to exit has a similar pattern than the average time to exit. The 
most notable difference is that Ontario rises to the third place, ahead of all US states.  
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 Chart 6A: Median Time Founding to Exit – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 6C: Median Time Founding to Exit – US Comparison States 
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4.2 Benchmarked exit values  
 
We now turn to the analysis of benchmarked exit values, to recognize the fact that 
different jurisdictions have different sizes and different economic structures. To account 
for the various ways in which jurisdictions differ from each other, we propose a variety of 
benchmarks for comparing exit performance.  
 
Our first benchmark is to normalize exit values by a broad measure of the size of each 
jurisdiction. For this we use a measure of the gross domestic product (GDP) of each 
province and state. This is sometimes also called the gross state product (GSP). With this, 
we can calculate total exit values per $1000 GDP. 
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 Chart 7A, B and C show that California and Massachusetts are distinct outliers with 
significantly higher exit values per GDP. This confirms the widely held notion that these 
two states constitute the leading jurisdictions for venture capital. Another interesting 
insight comes from comparing Chart 7A with Chart 7A. While Massachusetts is 
significantly behind California terms of its total exit value, it has an almost identical exit 
performance once we normalize by GDP. Put differently, California may seem a much 
larger venture capital market than Massachusetts, but this can be fully accounted for by 
the fact that California has a much larger economy.  
 
Another important insight from Chart 7A is that three of the Canadian provinces make it 
into the top ten. In particular Ontario ranks 7th, British Columbia 8th and Alberta 10th. 
This challenges the widely-held belief that the Canadian provinces are far behind US 
states. Chart 7B compares the exit values per GDP for the leading Canadian provinces. 
There is a relatively little difference between Ontario and British Columbia. Alberta is 
lagging only slightly on these terms, and Quebec (as well as the rest of Canada) is not far 
behind. Chart 7C shows the exit performance for the US comparison states. While Texas 
outperforms the other comparisons states in terms of total exit value, this is mainly due to 
the size of its economy. Indeed, Chart 7C shows that Texas has a comparable per GDP 
exit performance to that of North Carolina and Connecticut. Another interesting result is 
that Washington State has a better exit performance than the other US comparisons states. 
Finally, Oregon has a weaker performance, one that cannot be explained away by the 
smaller size of its economy. 
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 Chart 7A: Total Value of Exits per $1000 GDP – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 7C: Total Value of Exits per $1000 GDP – US Comparison States 
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The GDP benchmark controls for the overall size of the economy. But there are many 
sectors of the economy that have little to do with venture capital, and different 
jurisdictions may differ in terms of the relative importance of their research-intensive 
sectors. We therefore consider two benchmark measures that address the degree to which 
the economy of each jurisdiction is focused on research and innovation. In particular we 
compare the total exit value to the investments in research and development. For this we 
consider both total spending on R&D (measured by GERD), as well as total business 
spending on R&D (measured by BERD).  
 
Chart 8A shows that British Columbia has the highest exit value per dollar spent on 
R&D. Moreover, Alberta ranks 3rd and Ontario 8th. This suggests that Canadian 
provinces, especially British Columbia, are particularly efficient in converting R&D 
spending into value creation by venture-capital backed companies. Put differently, when 
we compare exit values against a measure of the size of the research sector, we find that 
Canadian provinces perform very well. What is particularly remarkable about this result 
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 is that British Columbia and Alberta (as well as Georgia) outperform the two leading 
venture capital jurisdictions of California and Massachusetts. It suggests that one of the 
main factors that can explain the success of California and Massachusetts is the large 
amount of research spending obtained by these two states. Once we control for the 
amount of money spent on R&D, we find that their performance is still very strong, but 
no longer an outlier. Chart 8B compares the main Canadian provinces, showing that the 
two Western provinces of Alberta and British Columbia are particularly efficient in terms 
of converting R&D dollars into exit values. Chart 8C shows that the cluster-oriented US 
comparisons states, North Carolina and Texas, outperform the other comparisons states 
on this benchmark. 
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 Chart 8B: Total Value of Exits per $1000 GERD – Canadian Provinces 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Alberta BC Ontario Quebec ROC
 
Chart 8C: Total Value of Exits per $1000 GERD – US Comparison States 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Connecticut North Carolina Oregon Texas Washington
 
 40
   
Charts 9A, B and C perform a similar analysis to Charts 8A, B and C, using total private 
business expenditures on R&D (as measured by BERD). The overall pattern of results is 
very similar. Alberta now has a slightly better performance than British Columbia. And 
the relative ranking of some US states is also slightly different. One notable result is that, 
in addition to Georgia, we now find that the District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland 
also outperform California and Massachusetts. The main reason for this is that these 
states receive significant amounts of public R&D spending, especially related to the 
defense sector.  
 
Chart 9A: Total Value of Exits per $1000 BERD – Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart 9B: Total Value of Exits per $1000 BERD – Canadian Provinces 
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Our next benchmark compares the total exit value to a 5-year moving average of venture 
capital investments. Chart 10A shows that three smaller states, The District of Columbia, 
Oklahoma and Indiana, rank at the top. We therefore should not infer too much from this 
particular result. The reason for this is that in a small market, it only takes one or two 
large exits to create such a high ratio.  
 
The most interesting results from Chart 10A is that neither California nor Massachusetts 
are in the top ten. This suggests that California and Massachusetts do not necessarily 
constitute the most attractive venture capital markets, in terms of generating a return to 
venture capital investments. Another interesting finding is that British Columbia 
continues to perform well on this metric. Chart 10B suggests that British Columbia 
outperforms both Ontario and Quebec. However, it is worthwhile repeating the caveat 
from section 2.5, related to the quality of the underlying data. While we have a lot of 
confidence in the measurement of the exit value, we have less confidence in the available 
measures of aggregate venture capital investments in Canada. This also explains the 
absence of Alberta from Charts 10A and B. In addition, it is possible that there is 
significant underreporting of venture capital investments in some of the smaller Canadian 
provinces, which would explain why the rest of Canada appears to perform so well in 
Chart 10B. Chart 10C shows the result for our US comparison states. Again, we find that 
the cluster-oriented states of North Carolina and Texas perform particularly well.  
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 Chart 10A: Total Value of Exits by Preceding 5 Year Average VC Investment – Top 
10 Jurisdictions 
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 Chart excludes Alberta  
 
Chart 10C: Total Value of Exits by Preceding 5 Year Average VC Investment – US 
Comparison States 
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Our final benchmark takes a slightly different approach for measuring exit values. One 
notable feature of our sample is that it includes the so-called dotcom boom and bust. Our 
measurement of exit values is therefore influenced by the performance of the stock 
market at the time of exit. To account for any possible distortion that this may create in 
our comparison of jurisdictions, we consider a measure of exit performance that accounts 
for the timing of the exit events. Specifically we divide each exit value by the index value 
of the NASDAQ at the time of exit. Essentially, this allows us to deflate the high exit 
values that occurred at the peak of the dotcom bubble. Chart 11A, B and C show the 
results. Comparing this with Charts 1A, B and C, we notice that the normalization hardly 
affects the relative ranking of jurisdictions. Chart 11D compares the Canadian provinces 
using the TSX index as an alternative to the NASDAQ index. The results are very similar 
to Chart 11B.  
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Chart 11A: Total Value of Exits Normalized by the NASDAQ Composite Index – 
Top 10 Jurisdictions 
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Chart 11B: Total Value of Exits Normalized by the NASDAQ Composite Index – 
Canadian Provinces 
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Chart 11C: Total Value of Exits Normalized by the NASDAQ Composite Index – 
US Comparison States 
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 Chart 11D: Total Value of Exits Normalized by the TSX Composite Index – 
Canadian Provinces 
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4.3. Sector comparisons 
 
In this section we examine how exit values differ across different sectors. We focus on 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Life Sciences, Energy and 
Sustainable Technology (EST), and “other” sectors (mainly manufacturing and services). 
Table A3 in the appendix contains a more detailed breakdown of the four sectors, for all 
Canadian provinces, and the US states with more than US$1 billion in exit value. 
 
Chart 12A and B show the relative contributions of each of these sectors to the total exit 
value. Chart 12A shows that there are considerable differences across the various 
Canadian provinces in terms of their sector focus. EST accounts for the majority of exit 
values in Alberta. ICT accounts for the majority of exit values in British Columbia. 
Quebec is particularly unique, in that the majority of its investments are classified as 
“other.”, but Life Sciences and ICT are also important in Quebec. Chart 12B shows that 
the US comparisons states resemble each other in terms of their sector compositions. ICT 
is the dominant sector for all of the five provinces. One surprising result is that in North 
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 Carolina, which is widely known for its life sciences, ICT continues to be the largest 
contributor to exit values. 
 
Charts 13A and B show the percentage that each of these sectors contributes to the total 
exit value. They show a similar pattern of results than Charts 12A and B.  
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 Chart 12A: Composition of Total Value of Exits – Canadian Provinces 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Alberta BC Ontario Quebec ROC
Energy & Sustainable Technologies Information & Communication Technologies
Life Sciences Other
 
Chart 12B: Composition of Total Value of Exits – US Comparison States 
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 Chart 13A: Total Value of Exits by Sectors – Canadian Provinces 
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Chart 13B: Total Value of Exits by Sectors – US Comparison States 
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 Charts 14A and B show the median exit value for each of the four sectors. One 
interesting finding is that EST attracts the highest exit values in the two western 
provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, while ICT dominates for the two eastern 
provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In the US, ICT and life sciences generate the largest 
median exit values. Oregon, in fact, does not even have any exits outside of these two 
sectors.  
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 Chart 14B: Median Value of Exits by Sectors – US Comparison States 
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4.4. Time trends 
 
Our data allows us to examine how exit values change over time. We briefly examine 
some of the broad trends that can be observed over the period 1997 to 2004. Charts 15A 
and B shows the evolution of total exit values for Canada and the US respectively. We 
immediately note that exit values move in tandem with stock markets. We find that exit 
values peaked in 2000 in Canada. In the US, exit value peaked in both 1999 and 2000. 
Another interesting trend is that exit values made a significant comeback in 2004, both in 
Canada and the US. Indeed, while the period 2001 to 2003 witnessed lower exit values 
than before the dotcom bubble, 2004 shows a significant recovery, with exit values that 
exceed those from the period before 1999.  
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 Chart 15A: Total Value of Exits by Year – Canada 
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Chart 15B: Total Value of Exits by Year – US 
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Charts 16A and B examine the time trends of the median exit value for Canada and the 
US respectively. The Canadian data for median exit values has a very similar pattern than 
the total exit value. The same can be said for the median exit values of acquisitions in the 
US. However, an interesting result is that the median IPO value in the US remained high, 
even throughout the period 2001 to 2003. While there were significantly fewer 
companies that went public during this period, those few companies that did manage to 
go public retained high exit values. 
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Chart 16B: Median Value of Exits by Year – US 
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Charts 17A and B examine the time trends of the median time to exit. An interesting 
trend is that at the height of the dotcom bubble, companies were particularly young at the 
time of exit. However, as the bubble burst, the median age of companies rose 
dramatically. This trend is apparent not only for the US, but also for Canada. 
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 Chart 17A: Median Time from Founding to Exit, by Exit Year – Canada  
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 5. Conclusion 
 
This study is the first to compare the exit values of venture capital backed companies in 
Canada and the US. Our results challenge the notion that the Canadian venture capital 
market is significantly behind that of the US. While it is true that total and average exit 
values are smaller in Canada, our analysis shows that once we account for the different 
sizes of the two economies, the Canadian venture capital market performs surprisingly 
well and, if anything, better than the U.S. 
 
Our analysis has several important policy implications. First, in evaluating the efficiency 
of a venture capital market it is important to go beyond the measurement of inputs, (i.e. 
beyond just venture capital investments). Our analysis provides one method of measuring  
the most critical output in the venture capital market, namely the value created by its 
companies. A second important policy implication of our analysis is that in evaluating the 
performance of a venture capital market it is important to consider not only the successes 
from initial public offerings, but also from acquisitions of venture-backed enterprises. 
Finally our analysis suggests that any performance evaluation also needs to incorporate 
proper benchmarks. In addition to measuring the total value created, it is important to 
benchmark these values against their inputs, such as the amount of venture capital 
investment, or the amount of relevant R&D spending. 
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 Appendix I: Industry Classifications  
 
NAIC codes for Energy and Sustainable Technology 
 
NAIC Description 
211111 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 
211112 Natural Gas Liquid Extraction 
212111 Bituminous Coal and Lignite Surface Mining 
212112 Bituminous Coal Underground Mining 
212291 Uranium-Radium-Vanadium Ore Mining 
213111 Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 
213112 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations 
221110 Other Clean Energy 
221111 Hydroelectric Power Generation 
221112 Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation 
221113 Nuclear Electric Power Generation 
221119 Other Electric Power Generation 
221121 Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control 
221122 Electric Power Distribution 
221210 Natural Gas Distribution 
221310 Water Supply and Irrigation Systems 
221320 Sewage Treatment Facilities 
221330 Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply 
324110 Petroleum Refineries 
333411 Air Purification Equipment Manufacturing 
333611 Turbine and Turbine Generator Set Units Manufacturing 
333612 Speed Changer, Industrial High-Speed Drive, and Gear Manufacturing 
333613 Mechanical Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing 
333618 Other Engine Equipment Manufacturing 
333911 Pump and Pumping Equipment Manufacturing 
333912 Air and Gas Compressor Manufacturing 
333913 Measuring and Dispensing Pump Manufacturing 
333995 Fluid Power Cylinder and Actuator Manufacturing 
333996 Fluid Power Pump and Motor Manufacturing 
335311 Power, Distribution, and Specialty Transformer Manufacturing 
335312 Motor and Generator Manufacturing 
335911 Storage Battery Manufacturing 
335912 Primary Battery Manufacturing 
335931 Current-Carrying Wiring Device Manufacturing 
423930 Recyclable Material Merchant Wholesalers 
424710 Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals 
 424720 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers  
(except Bulk Stations and Terminals) 
447110 Gasoline Stations with Convenience Stores 
447190 Other Gasoline Stations 
454311 Heating Oil Dealers 
454312 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Bottled Gas) Dealers 
454319 Other Fuel Dealers 
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 486110 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 
486210 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas 
486910 Pipeline Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products 
486990 All Other Pipeline Transportation 
541620 Environmental Consulting Services 
562111 Solid Waste Collection 
562112 Hazardous Waste Collection 
562119 Other Waste Collection 
562211 Hazardous Waste Treatment and Disposal 
562212 Solid Waste Landfill 
562213 Solid Waste Combustors and Incinerators 
562219 Other Nonhazardous Waste Treatment and Disposal 
562910 Remediation Services 
562920 Materials Recovery Facilities 
562991 Septic Tank and Related Services 
562998 All Other Miscellaneous Waste Management Services 
813312 Environment, Conservation and Wildlife Organizations 
924110 Administration of Air and Water Resource and Solid Waste 
Management Programs 
924120 Administration of Conservation Programs 
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 NAIC Codes for Information and Communication Technology 
 
NAIC Description 
333295 Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing 
334111 Electronics Computer Manufacturing 
334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing 
334113 Computer Terminal Manufacturing 
334119 Other Computer Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
334210 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 
334220 
Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications 
Equipment Manufacturing 
334290 Other Communications Equipment Manufacturing 
334413 Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing 
334611 Software Reproducing 
335921 Fiber Optic Cable Manufacturing 
335929 Other Communication and Energy Wire Manufacturing 
423430 
Computer and Computer Peripheral Equipment and Software 
Merchant Wholesalers 
443120 Computer and Software Stores 
511210 Software Publishers 
516110 Internet Publishing and Broadcasting 
517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 
517211 Paging 
517212 Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications 
517310 Telecommunications Resellers 
517410 Satellite Telecommunications 
517910 Other Telecommunications 
518111 Internet Service Providers 
518112 Web Search Portals 
518210 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 
519190 All Other Information Services 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 
541512 Computer Systems Design Services 
541513 Computer Facilities Management Services 
541519 Other Computer Related Services 
611420 Computer Training 
811212 Computer and Office Machine Repair and Maintenance 
811213 Communication Equipment Repair and Maintenance 
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 NAIC Codes for Life Sciences 
 
NAIC Description 
325221 Cellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing 
325222 Noncellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing 
325411 Medicinal and Botanical Manufacturing 
325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 
325413 In-Vitro Diagnostic Substance Manufacturing 
325414 Biological Product (except Diagnostic) Manufacturing 
334510 Electro-medical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus Manufacturing 
339110 Medical Supplies 
339112 Surgical and Medical Instrument Manufacturing 
339113 Surgical Appliance and Supplies Manufacturing 
339114 Dental Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing 
339115 Ophthalmic Goods Manufacturing 
339116 Dental Laboratories 
423450 
Medical, Dental, and Hospital Equipment and Supplies Merchant 
Wholesalers 
423460 Ophthalmic Goods Merchant Wholesalers 
424210 Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers 
446110 Pharmacies and Drug Stores 
446130 Optical Goods Stores 
541380 Testing Laboratories 
621111 Offices of Physicians (except Mental Health Specialists) 
621112 Offices of Physicians, Mental Health Specialists 
621210 Offices of Dentists 
621310 Offices of Chiropractors 
621320 Offices of Optometrists 
621330 Offices of Mental Health Practitioners (except Physicians) 
621340 
Offices of Physical, Occupational and Speech Therapists, and 
Audiologists 
621391 Offices of Podiatrists 
621399 Offices of All Other Miscellaneous Health Practitioners 
621410 Family Planning Centers 
621420 Outpatient Mental Health and Substance Abuse Centers 
621491 HMO Medical Centers 
621492 Kidney Dialysis Centers 
621493 Freestanding Ambulatory Surgical and Emergency Centers 
621498 All Other Outpatient Care Centers 
621511 Medical Laboratories 
621512 Diagnostic Imaging Centers 
621610 Home Health Care Services 
621910 Ambulance Services 
621991 Blood and Organ Banks 
621999 All Other Miscellaneous Ambulatory Health Care Services 
622110 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals 
622210 Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Hospitals 
622310 Specialty (except Psychiatric and Substance Abuse) Hospitals 
623110 Nursing Care Facilities 
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 623210 Residential Mental Retardation Facilities 
623220 Residential Mental Health and Substance Abuse Facilities 
623311 Continuing Care Retirement Communities 
 
 
Mapping from Thomson’s Venture Economics “Industry Sub Group 2” 
classification to our industry classification 
 
EST stands for “Energy and Sustainable Technology” 
ICT stands for “Information and Communication Technology” 
 
Thomson Industry Sub Group 2 Our sector definition 
Agricultural, Forestry Other 
Batteries EST 
Biosensors Life Sciences 
Biotech Equipment Life Sciences 
Biotech Other Life Sciences 
Biotech Research Life Sciences 
Biotech-Animal Life Sciences 
Biotech-Human Life Sciences 
Biotech-Industrial Life Sciences 
Business Services Other 
Chemicals and Materials Other 
Comm. Other ICT  
Commer Comm. ICT  
Computer Other ICT  
Computer Peripherals ICT  
Computer Programming ICT  
Computer Services ICT  
Computer Software ICT  
Computers Hardware ICT  
Construction Other 
Consumer Products Other 
Consumer Services Other 
Consumer, Other Other 
Data Comm. ICT  
Digital Imaging and Computer Graphics ICT  
E-Commerce Technology ICT  
Electronics Equipment Other 
Electronics, Other Other 
Energy, Alternative EST 
Energy, Coal EST 
Energy, Conservation EST 
Energy, Enhanced Recovery EST 
Energy, Other EST 
Entertainment and Leisure Other 
Facsimile Trans Other 
Fiber Optics ICT  
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 Financial Services Other 
Food and Beverage Other 
Industrial Automation Other 
Industrial Equipment Other 
Industrial Products, Other Other 
Industrial Services Other 
Internet Communications ICT  
Internet Content ICT  
Internet Ecommerce ICT  
Internet Programming ICT  
Internet Services ICT  
Internet Software ICT  
Laser Related ICT  
Manufacturing Other 
Med/Health Products Life Sciences 
Med/Health Services Life Sciences 
Medical Diagnostics Life Sciences 
Medical Therapeutics Life Sciences 
Oil & Gas Exploration EST 
Optoelectronics ICT  
Other Other 
Pharmaceutical Life Sciences 
Pollution and Recycling EST 
Power Supplies EST 
Retailing Related Other 
Satellite Comm ICT  
Scientific Instrumentation ICT  
Semiconductors/Other Electronics ICT  
Telephone Rel. ICT  
Transportation Other 
Turnkey Integrated Systems and Solutions Other 
Utilities EST 
Wireless Communications ICT  
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 Appendix II: Extensive data tabulation  
 
Table A1: Total Exit Value by Exit Type: Canadian Provinces 
 
 
IPO 
(US$m) 
M&A 
(US$m) 
Total 
(US$m) 
Canadian Provinces    
Alberta      2,723       1,066       3,789  
British Columbia (BC)      2,102       2,098       4,201  
Manitoba         423          517          940  
New Brunswick         278          598          877  
Newfoundland             6              2              8  
Nova Scotia         138          741          879  
Ontario      6,275       7,683      13,958  
Quebec      3,271       1,732       5,002  
Saskatchewan             8            76            84  
Canada Total     15,224      14,514      29,737  
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Table A1 (continued): Total Exit Value by Exit Type: US States 
 
IPO 
(US$m) 
M&A 
(US$m) 
Total 
(US$m) 
US States    
Alabama           -              54            54  
Arizona         614          450       1,064  
Arkansas           -              40            40  
California   104,854      62,020    166,874  
Colorado      5,652       3,017       8,669  
Connecticut      4,522       1,103       5,626  
D. of Columbia      1,201          296       1,497  
Delaware           77            -              77  
Florida      5,376       2,262       7,638  
Georgia      7,609       2,720      10,328  
Hawaii         314            23          337  
Idaho           66            43          109  
Illinois      4,484       3,377       7,860  
Indiana           76          942       1,018  
Iowa           -              23            23  
Kansas         533            95          628  
Kentucky         137          734          871  
Louisiana         642            34          676  
Maine           49            -              49  
Maryland      6,711       2,176       8,887  
Massachusetts     13,166      22,265      35,432  
Michigan         679       1,142       1,821  
Minnesota      4,218       2,385       6,602  
Mississippi           -            216          216  
Missouri         739          737       1,475  
Montana         202              3          206  
Nebraska         267            10          277  
Nevada         232            -            232  
New Hampshire         469          288          757  
New Jersey      5,161       5,723      10,884  
New York     17,159       3,374      20,533  
North Carolina      5,804       4,521      10,325  
North Dakota         220            -            220  
Ohio         234       1,727       1,961  
Oklahoma         103       1,112       1,215  
Oregon         968          432       1,400  
Pennsylvania      5,929       3,048       8,977  
Puerto Rico           -              75            75  
Rhode Island           -              15            15  
South Carolina           -            671          671  
Tennessee      1,931          825       2,756  
Texas     15,574      10,286      25,860  
Unknown           -            207          207  
Utah         252          656          908  
Vermont         207            28          235  
Virginia      8,741       3,769      12,511  
Washington      9,935       1,694      11,629  
Wisconsin         813          831       1,643  
US Total   235,920    145,448    381,367  
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Canadian Provinces and US States (above $1B)  
 
Total 
Value 
of Exits
(US$m)
Number 
of Exits 
(Total) 
Avg. 
Exit 
Value 
(US$m)
Median 
Exit 
Value 
(US$m)
Avg. 
Time 
Foundin
g to Exits 
(Months) 
Median 
Time 
Founding 
to Exit 
(Months) 
  
Canadian Provinces  
Alberta 3,789 60 63 15 39 26
British Columbia 4,201 70 61 18 47 41
Manitoba 940 11 85 18 43 30
New Brunswick 877 8 110 50 95 76
Newfoundland 8 2 4 4 47 47
Nova Scotia 879 7 126 104 36 36
Ontario 13,958     223 63 25 81 46
Quebec 5,002 118 42 16 98 5,002 
Saskatchewan 84 10 8 4 154 154
  
US States  
Arizona  1,064  19 89 52 117 89
California 166,874  1,209 207 101 72 56
Colorado  8,669  90 152 75 90 67
Connecticut  5,626  43 176 97 97 72
D. of Columbia  1,497  11 214 156 193 51
Florida  7,638  65 178 81 121 82
Georgia 10,328  96 178 110 74 59
Illinois  7,860  64 212 97 84 68
Indiana  1,018  10 145 101 99 70
Maryland  8,887  56 254 95 90 68
Massachusetts 35,432  336 159 80 87 68
Michigan  1,821  23 166 86 97 87
Minnesota  6,602  52 194 137 123 107
Missouri  1,475  14 148 135 112 95
New Jersey 10,884  80 202 113 93 76
New York 20,533  147 214 72 88 66
North Carolina 10,325  72 220 99 66 50
Ohio  1,961  34 123 87 181 84
Oklahoma  1,215  10 135 86 71 60
Oregon  1,400  24 108 97 81 59
Pennsylvania  8,977  88 147 52 96 69
Tennessee  2,756  30 138 85 120 97
Texas 25,860  155 259 109 97 63
Virginia 12,511  78 284 116 78 66
Washington 11,629  97 176 100 62 53
Wisconsin  1,643  14 137 32 153 122
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Table A2 (continued) 
 
Ratio to 
GDP 
(Per $1k) 
Ratio to 
GERD 
(Per $1k) 
Ratio to  
BERD 
(Per $1k) 
Ratio to 
VC 
Invest 
(Per $1) 
Value 
over 
NSDQ 
(US$m) 
Value 
over 
TSX 
(US$m) 
  
Canadian Provinces  
Alberta 4.57 460.68 1031.89 21.99   2,098   2,373 
British Columbia 5.78 494.24 889.76 3.04   2,130   2,859 
Manitoba 4.93 431.29 1282.54 N/A      626      770 
New Brunswick 7.92 963.98 4344.49 N/A      378      579 
Newfoundland 0.10 10.96 84.01 N/A 6          6 
Nova Scotia 6.47 472.66 2511.74 N/A      525      626 
Ontario 5.81 285.40 410.20 1.71   6,401   9,305 
Quebec 3.96 161.86 261.72 1.17 2,918 3,435 
Saskatchewan 0.47 43.26 183.81 N/A        39        53 
  
US States  
Arizona 0.82 41.95 52.56 0.74  513 N/A
California 16.31 407.99 494.48 1.89 82,505 N/A
Colorado 6.41 261.69 351.70 1.10  4,330 N/A
Connecticut 4.37 156.74 175.99 1.97  3,259 N/A
D. of Columbia 1.96 0.00 0.00 10.68  900 N/A
Florida 4.43 205.67 299.53 1.13  3,857 N/A
Georgia 2.11 475.87 830.32 2.75  5,479 N/A
Illinois 0.65 86.93 105.99 1.50  4,033 N/A
Indiana 5.92 40.29 48.73 4.81  610 N/A
Maryland 16.29 133.30 591.33 2.69  4,599 N/A
Massachusetts 0.68 348.42 456.99 1.75 16,991 N/A
Michigan 4.38 12.92 13.84 3.19  851 N/A
Minnesota 1.03 201.15 232.26 1.90  3,218 N/A
Missouri 3.84 79.23 109.64 1.40  693 N/A
New Jersey 3.33 109.24 119.28 1.67  6,833 N/A
New York 4.60 190.25 241.00 1.66 10,315 N/A
North Carolina 0.66 259.94 352.82 2.92  5,405 N/A
Ohio 1.67 32.41 41.48 1.31  1,281 N/A
Oklahoma 1.57 237.33 449.51 5.22  617 N/A
Oregon 14.56 87.60 113.04 1.01  589 N/A
Pennsylvania 2.79 116.77 144.81 1.41  4,020 N/A
Tennessee 1.90 165.58 251.20 1.73  1,586 N/A
Texas 4.42 285.90 367.27 2.50 13,686 N/A
Virginia 5.85 316.59 608.73 2.15  6,664 N/A
Washington 6.56 151.17 171.92 1.77  5,559 N/A
Wisconsin 1.14 79.06 106.16 2.78  896 N/A
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Table A3: Sector Statistics for Canadian Provinces and US States (above $1B) 
 
Total Exit Value EST 
(US$m) 
ICT 
(US$m) 
Life Sciences 
(US$m) 
Other 
(US$m) 
Canadian Provinces     
Alberta 2,843 402 115 429 
British Columbia  101 3,045 413 642 
Manitoba - 478   -     462 
New Brunswick - 299   -     577 
Newfoundland - 2   -     6 
Nova Scotia - 485   -     394 
Ontario 1,006 8,698 327 3,927 
Quebec 45  1,401  1,501  2,056  
Saskatchewan 16 18 3 47 
     
US States     
Arizona 159 242 185 477 
California 345 132,816 22,089 11,625 
Colorado 1,408 5,321 1,245 695 
Connecticut   -    3,656 1,243 727 
D. of Columbia   -    1,254 163 80 
Florida 22 5,109 1,273 1,234 
Georgia 46 8,270 1,003 1,010 
Illinois 549 4,185 309 2,817 
Indiana   -    50 36 932 
Maryland 988 6,451 704 744 
Massachusetts 232 28,360 4,239 2,601 
Michigan   -    978 398 445 
Minnesota   -    4,789 742 1,071 
Missouri   -    168 361 947 
New Jersey 5 7,173 1,749 1,958 
New York 280 14,202 1,750 4,301 
North Carolina 94 7,585 1,723 924 
Ohio 84 1,470 262 145 
Oklahoma 677 50 191 297 
Oregon   -    1,297 103   -    
Pennsylvania   -    4,337 2,819 1,821 
Tennessee   -    443 1,556 757 
Texas 703 18,603 2,274 4,281 
Virginia   -    10,773 1,227 511 
Washington   -    9,533 1,562 534 
Wisconsin   -    4 793 846 
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Table A3 (continued)  
 
Median Exit Value EST 
(US$m) 
ICT 
(US$m) 
Life Sciences 
(US$m) 
Other 
(US$m) 
Canadian Provinces  
Alberta 31 4 25 19
British Columbia (BC) 29 18 14 23
Manitoba  -  27  -  8
New Brunswick  -  21  -  117
Newfoundland  -  2  -  6
Nova Scotia  -  105  -  32
Ontario 18 28 19 24
Quebec      12          21           14       20 
Saskatchewan 8 9 3 5
     
US States  
Arizona 159 32 185 57
California 12 92 118 132
Colorado 704 59 93 70
Connecticut  -  153 28 47
D. of Columbia  -  156 163 80
Florida 22 113 298 49
Georgia 46 109 89 142
Illinois 275 63 80 102
Indiana  -  25 36 166
Maryland 988 45 170 177
Massachusetts 116 90 50 55
Michigan  -  40 199 86
Minnesota  -  146 57 141
Missouri  -  14 141 392
New Jersey 5 120 112 108
New York 280 50 73 116
North Carolina 94 101 100 91
Ohio 84 88 131 42
Oklahoma 338 50 95 81
Oregon  -  80 103  -  
Pennsylvania  -  48 77 28
Tennessee  -  73 97 38
Texas 100 146 122 95
Virginia  -  94 262 256
Washington  -  102 98 64
Wisconsin  -  4 356 32
 
 
